Vladimir Dimitrov

Introduction

Soft System Methodology (SSM) is a systematic inquiring process developed by Peter Checkland for analysis of poorly defined systems with a strongly imbedded 'human element'. According to Checkland, "models in SSM are constructs which represent, from some explicit pure point of view, purposeful human activity."[1].

SSM inquiry is structured around a comparison between a real-world problem situation and conceptual models of relevant systems of purposeful activity and includes the following three major stages:

Stage 1. Finding out about the problem situation

Stage 2. Use of systems thinking to build conceptual models of the situation

Stage 3. Taking actions to improve the situation.

The above three stages incorporate also Vicker's appreciative system approach [2] in a series of participatory action research cycles repeated until satisfactory (from points of view of the participants concerned with the problem situation) improvements are reached.

SSM is useful for studying problem areas where human expertise is of a vital importance. This makes SSM effective in the development of problem-driven expert systems. Fuzzy logic has been successfully used in various practical applications of these systems [3].

In complex and chaotic dynamics of to-day's society, where economical, political, ecological, cultural, etc. phenomena, events and processes emerge in unpredictable way out of a tangled web of ever-changing interactions of huge number of interwoven factors, SSM constructs of 'purposeful human activity' lose their efficiency. Well-defined problems simply do not exist in such an environment, and poorly or ill definitions often bring inquiry processes to blind alleys.

Nonlinear dynamic world of spontaneous emergence and bifurcations, chaotic attractors and fractals, autopoiesis and self-organization call for new methodologies free from fixed periodicity of action learning cycles, from fragmentarity of experts' knowledge, from adopted standards of optimal ('good', 'right', 'ethical', etc.) value judgements, from the burden of time linearity and related to it cause-and-effect explanations, from the entire ideology of purposeful improvements which permeate most of the approaches under the umbrella of SSM.

Any pre-selected purpose, goal, objective, value standard, milestone and plan inevitably stumble over the chaotic dynamics of social complexity. Even the term improvement does not make much sense when dealing with ever-emerging turbulence in the flow of life. How can we improve the whirlpool in the flow of a river? Improvements always imply purposive interventions, that is, interventions guided by preliminary defined purposes. Such purposes turn to be misleading when dealing with sparkling spontaneity of self-organizing processes of reality. And it is this sparkling spontaneity which propels the best of our capabilities as humans - to create, discover and discriminate between truth and illusions.

A purposive rational inference or intervention, be it individual or participatory, hard or soft, precise or fuzzy, linear or cyclic, theoretical or experiential, ontological or epistemic, ethical or aesthetical, action-research or action-learning based, cannot help but limiting serendipity of those who navigate through the labyrinth of chaos and complexity. Serendipity is a virtual faculty - it could be evoked, explored, nourished and energized, but never purposed or imposed, inserted or transferred from one place to another, prescribed or ordered, directed or controlled. It needs freedom in order to self-realize and blossom. It needs a different type of logic - a logic that underlies processes in their becoming and thus helps to 'sense' the meaning of what is going to emerge.

The logic underlying processes in their becoming is virtual. The meaning of what is going to emerge is a virtual meaning.

Virtual Semiotic Methodology applies virtual logic and operates with virtual meanings when exploring the whirling dynamics of social complexity.

 

Virtuality of Meaning

Both verbal and non-verbal human expressions have a unique temporal property: the meaning of an expression simultaneously reflects past, present and future of individual and group experience.

Past relates to the probabilistic characteristic of an expression: the expression appears as the most probable response under the experience and knowledge accumulated in the past. Present refers to the actual circumstances facilitating both the formation and interpretation of the expression. Future evokes possibilities for new comprehension of the expression and thus provides a virtual space for evolution of its meaning.

In continuity of human experience, meaning always espouses virtuality. This was perfectly understood by Peirce - the co-founder (together with Saussure) of semiotics, who wrote in 1905: "No present actual thought has any meaning, any intellectual value; for this lies, not in what is actually thought, but in what this thought may be connected with in representation by subsequent thoughts; so that the meaning of a thought is altogether something virtual" [4].
 
 

Virtual Logic and Semiosis

According to Kauffman [5], virtual logic is "that which energizes reason": "Virtual logic is not logic, nor is it the actual subject matter of the mathematics, physics or cybernetics in which it may appear to be embedded... It is the pivot that allows us to move from one world of ideas to another."

Kauffman is convinced that what empowers us 'to move from one world of ideas to another' is not necessarily itself purposive, reasonable or logical. "There are many ways in which we encounter this sort of virtuality. One way is to proceed from within an apparently logical system and push its boundaries, find its limits. Another is to arrive from without in a leap, a bound, a jump into something new."

The way we have adopted is the way of semiosis - a process of using, consciously or unconsciously, various signs and signs structures when making sense of a complex dynamic pattern as a whole.

The wholeness is a virtual entity - its numerous dynamic aspects have unlimited potential for becoming, that is, expanding or withdrawing, sustaining or destroying, transforming or transcending themselves. The process of making meaning about the wholeness, that is, the process of semiosis, is impregnated by this virtuality.

Peirce put it directly: semiosis is inherently virtual - it inevitably includes appearance (emergence, discovery, creation) of connections (relations) between signs (things, events, phenomena, processes), a priori seen as not interacting with each other. Because of its virtuality, semiosis provides a basis for exploring holistic nature of complex reality, where 'everything relates to everything', and for eliciting distinguishable dynamic patterns emerging out of the tangled web of interdependent relationships.

The roots of semiosis are in the fertile soil of direct living experience, 'ploughed' by the human vigor to understand its emergent enigmas and paradoxes.

Example 1

Let us use virtual logic to elicit the relations between the constituents of the following three dynamic complexes:

´ body, mind, and nature

´ perception, representation, and consciousness

´ time, space, and existence.

Each complex has a triadic 'fractal' structure. Mandelbrot's concept of fractals [6] is used in chaos theory to explain the nested structures of chaotic (strange) attractors. Fractals reveal both the integrity (wholeness) and diversity of complex formations and provide a key for understanding their intricate dynamic behaviour.

In the first nested complex, 'body' has the potential to virtually affect the functioning of 'mind', and 'mind' can be empowered (energized, inspired) to affect, again virtually, the functioning of 'body', while they both inseparably exist in the wholeness of 'nature'. Nature manifests through them, keeps their integrity, and nourishes their functioning. And vice versa, the level of development of body and mind abilities determines the ways an individual perceives nature.

The virtual interplay between the 'fractals' of the second complex: perception, representation and consciousness are described by Kristeva [7]. For Kristeva semiosis is a complex process of signification emerging out of the interaction of a large number of activities aimed at widening the virtual meaning of signs. She characterizes these processes as "waves of attack against stases": both perception and representation demonstrate human potential to prevent unchanging signs from 'entering' consciousness. The waves of attack reveal continuity of co-evolving dynamics of perception and representation in the complex process of signification: at the level of representation, it becomes possible for the images of repeated stimuli to be continuously constructed, against which perception matches the incoming signs. The effect is a virtual defense of consciousness against penetration of repetitive stimuli.

In the third complex, existence unfolds in a spatio-temporal continuum. Animated and non-animated existential forms need space to expose their virtual properties. Through their spatial changes, it becomes possible for time to express itself. Thus time also needs space for its virtual manifestation. And vice versa, every point in space needs time to exhibit potentiality for self-organization of the existential forms located at this point. Through the cyclic triad of creation, preservation and destruction (transformation), time and space demonstrate continuity and the wholeness of existence.

 

Virtual Semiotic Methodology

As far as semiosis is a process common to all existential forms, it can be used as a source for developing a methodology for studying dynamics of these forms. We refer to it as Virtual Semiotic Methodology.

Virtual Semiotic Methodology (VSM) aims at discovery or creation of virtual connections between events, phenomena and processes considered in their unfolding dynamics.

When approaching social complexity, VSM can use signs and sign structures of various forms (words, images, music, verbal and non-verbal expressions, narratives, Internet, multimedia) to explore and navigate through the ocean of human experience at different levels of its manifestation.
 

Working with VSM: Practical Considerations

1. Unchanging environment communicates nothing, therefore it does not represent
a field for application of VSM

According to Allot [8], in order to be able to perceive change, the perceiver must have retained the pattern of what constitutes an expected flow of events (situations, phenomena), that is, a flow of events considered as a 'normally expected'. Allot underlines that complexity of our brains must be structured in terms of some kind of 'expected' environment and "perception is the result of interaction, or matching between the expected environment and the current environment by which change is detected". If no change is detected, Kristeva's 'waves of attack against stasis', mentioned in Example 1, will prevent the emergence of meaning for the perceiver.

Example 2

The bearers of the most meaningful signs for the survival of any firm are the markets, because of their rapid and unpredictable changes driven by competition, shifts in technology, and permanent interplay of various economical, political and cultural factors. With the highest chance for survival are those firms that are able quickly to adjust their rhythm (characterized by two vital signs: pace of introducting new products and 'choreography' of transitions from one activity to another) with the dynamics of markets' characteristics.

In the presence of high-velocity markets the way for dealing with future is not through scenario planning or building predictive models but by promoting individual and organizational capacity for change.

The viability of an organization is not judged by the presence of signs revealing its sustainability (persistence through stability) but depends on the dynamics of signs demonstrating its fitness for change, ability to 'embrace' the unknown and to co-evolve with it.

2. Signs group in dynamic sign structures with different degrees of complexity

For example, the expression "war in Kosovo" represented a complex sign structure simultaneously pointing to:

• ethnic cleansing of Albanian population conducted by Serbian army in Kosovo
• NATO bombardment of military targets in Yugoslavia, and at the same time destruction of human life, material objects and the environment
• millions of people suffering either from the ethnic cleansing or from the bombardment.

The narratives about the war in Kosovo shared by people are examples of sign structures with complex semiotic (meaning-related) dynamics. The meaning of these structures changes when 'moving' from one group of people to another: the narratives shared by Albanian refugees differ from the narratives of ordinary Serbian people, which are entirely different from the narratives of the official political propaganda in Belgrade. The narratives shared by people living in the neighbor countries differ from the narratives of those who live in the countries participating in NATO military operations. The narratives of those who express their sympathy and solidarity with Albanian refugees are different from the narratives of those who support the policy of Yugoslavian government.

Simultaneous consideration of the available narratives helps to create an integral multidimensional meaning of the war in Kosovo as a ruthless social expression of the worst characteristics of human nature at the end of this bloody second millennium: intolerance to others' ways of thinking, thirst for power, and lack of unconditional virtues.

With VSM we constantly try to capture as full as possible the meanings of all available parallel sign structures in their dynamics and diversity, and thus to facilitate the emergence (or creation) of a coherent virtual meaning of the reality expressed through each of these structures.

3. Static sign structures are incompatible with VSM

Static sign structures bear pre-imposed, fixed meanings. Every military command is an example of such a structure. Dictators, bureaucrats and 'experts' all around the world prefer to deal with this kind of structure. Powerful economic, political and religious oligarchies conduct phenomenal brainwashing in to-day's world aimed at inserting static sign structures into human perception, interpretation and consciousness. The media (particularly, commercial TV channels) constantly impose fixed patterns of economic behaviour in service to a society based entirely on consumption, and thus stupefy billions of people, trying persistently to transform them into frantic competitive money-making robots. It is clear, that such transformation serves mostly to those who already possess a tremendous financial power in society.

VSM hardly tolerates meanings fixed once for ever. The whole idea of VSM is to liberate the meaning out of the prison of any pre-imposed interpretation and hence to extend its virtual space. Once the meaning is liberated, it would be difficult to push it again into a box with a fixed label.

4. Any knowledge 'for sure' may have fatal consequence on VSM application

The meanings related to such kind of definite knowledge tend to substitute for the meanings extracted from direct human experience.

This is a psychological paradox, which is extremely difficult to be dealt with. Once the meaning of living experience is substituted by a meaning fixed by a doctrine (dogma, prejudice, standard, stereotype, habit), VSM loses its creative potential, as its roots lay in direct experience of reality, that can never be fixed nor standardized.

Example 3

(1) Most of us know 'for sure' that everyday relaxed walking (or some kind of individually tailored physical exercises) is good for health, and yet we hardly find time for this. So often the meaning of this sign structure has been repeated, discussed and emphasized that it has become a bearer of a fixed meaning. Once the knowledge is fixed, the paradox of using this knowledge as a substitute for the genuine experience starts to operate. As a result, we hardly find time for walking or exercising; we prefer to be involved in activities the outcomes of which are uncertain: their meanings appear 'virtual' for us. Virtuality of meaning acts as an attractor in the dynamic continuum of our experience.

(2) Usually the addicts know 'for sure' that the addiction (alcohol, smoking, gambling, gluttony, etc.) can be fatal for their life; moreover, they are even convinced that they are able to change their addictive behaviour in any moment. This definite knowledge becomes an impassable psychological barrier for practically dealing with the addiction. That is why the first thing an alcoholic anonymous (AA) does is to declare genuinely his/her ignorance both about the nature of the addiction and about any prescribed way to stop its urge. Through surrendering to a force that is unknown and greater that personal 'determinacy' to fight the fatal addiction, AA succeeds in dealing with it.

Paradoxically enough, the more liberated (unfixed and flexible) our knowledge related to a specific sign structure, the easier we move into virtual space of meanings beyond this structure, and hence the higher our capacity to apply VSM.

It appears that a kind of 'disestablishment' of the meaning carried by a certain sign structure is necessary for its further virtual development; acceptance of 'disorder' (breaking certainty) at one scale is often consonant with 'order' (emergent of a coherent meaning) at another scale.

5. Fractality contributes in understanding virtuality

Fractals represent similar patterns appearing at different levels (scales) of a complex structure. Each pattern is an image of the whole structure.

The patterns that appear at different levels of a complex sign structure are bearers of meaning - they also exhibit similarity, as each of them relates to the same sign structure. Even tiny changes in the meaning at one level can immediately affect the meanings related to the other levels, and thus the meaning of the sign structure as a whole, that is, its virtual meaning. This kind of ïbutterfly effectÍ is of enormous significance for the practical application of VSM. It makes possible to radically change virtual meaning of a complex sign structure by consciously generated small changes in the meaning related to a level that is relatively easy to observe and study.
 

Example 4

Human health can be considered as a complex dynamic sign structure with three typical levels of manifestation: physical, emotional and mental. Although each level has its own set of signs indicating the state of individual health, there is similarity between the levels. For example, the signs of tension (or stress) observed in an individual indicate high degree of similarity through all the levels. This similarity makes tension and stress easily recognizable, no matter what level it reveals itself at. Semiotic dynamics of the signs (indicators) of tension reflect both the current degrees of vulnerability of each level and the intensity of the source of tension. If an intensive source of tension is activated at mental level (in the mental 'fractal' of health), one can expect virtual decrease in individual's ability to concentrate and think productively. If, despite of intensity of this source, the individual succeeds in keeping the efficiency of his/her thinking capacity high enough, tension will inevitably 'explode' either at emotional or at physical level, depending on which level is more vulnerable at the moment.

"Mens sana in corpore sano" (Healthy mind in a healthy body) says the famous Latin phrase. Translated into the language of fractal, this means that by actions, stimulating positive changes captured by the signs of health at physical level, we affect positively also our health at emotional and mental levels. As a result, changes occur in the whole virtual space of the dynamic sign structure related to the overall state of our health. The reverse Latin phrase: "Corpore sano in mens sana" (Healthy body in a healthy mind") also makes sense in the semiosis of fractals and virtuality. Positive emotions, combined with mental patterns in which we see ourselves healthy and capable to deal successfully with occurring health problems, bring forth favorable changes in our physical health (demonstrated through its dynamic sign structure), and thus affect the virtual space of the sign structure related to our health as a whole.  

Dealing with Self-Organization

By providing a limitless virtual space for meaning to emerge, VSM simultaneously creates free space for self-organizing capacity of complex dynamics to reveal the characteristic signs of its nature. VSM does not try to push the dynamics of signs into Procrustean beds of various 'hard' and 'soft' theoretical models. On the contrary, its exploratory tools adapt to and co-evolve together with self-organizing dynamics of the signs.

The approach used by VSM for understanding and working with self-organization includes:

• gently 'nudging' from within the unfolding dynamics in order to understand how the process of self-organization works: what are the characteristic signs of this process?, how these signs relate to each other?, what kind of changes they undergo?
• carefully 'catalyzing' the process of self-organization by pointing to signs and sign structures that reveal forces acting against self-organization, and thus 'assisting' the actors to cope with these forces.

Example 5

(1) At individual level, 'nudging' from within means experimenting with various experiential options in order to capture the signs of 'resonance' for some options with the inner personal drive for evolution and growth. The 'voice' of the inner drive is often very silent and requires high level of attention, observation and vigilance. Once heard, the voice of individual self-organization can be amplified and provided with virtual space for realization. Education and self-education intend to offer such a space.

(2) Self-organizing capacity of an organization is revealed through a joint activity of its members. The more complementary and coherent this activity, and the lower the degree of using a power-based hierarchy, the stronger the collective self-organizing ability of the organization. A great deal of to-day's research in complexity is devoted to explore practical ways of stimulating self-organizing capacity of organization [9].  

Conclusion

Society is becoming more complex and dynamic, and the manifestation of spontaneous social self-organization (including self-organizing criticality) is more evident. Social researchers need to keep pace with this process by bringing new dimensions to their understanding of and dealing with the social dynamics.

Virtual Semiotic Methodology (VSM) tries to extend systemic inquiring process beyond the scope of Soft System Methodology, and thus to make it applicable to self-organizing dynamics of social complexity.

At the core of VSM is the process of virtual semiosis: use of various signs and signs structures while making sense of a complex dynamic structure as a whole.

Examples eliciting various social applications of VSM reveal it as a form of evocative exploration, the future development of which will require elaboration and refinement of semiotic tools to stimulate both the self-organizing capacity and the evolutionary drive of the individuals and society.
 
 
 

 

References

1. Checkland P. 1981 Systems Thinking, Systems practice, John Willey

2. Checkland P. and A. Casar, 1986 Vickers' Conept of an Appreciative System: a Systematic Account, Journal of Applied System Analysis, 13, pp.3-17

3. Reznik L., V.Dimitrov and J. Kacprzyk (eds.), 1998 Fuzzy Systems Design: Social and Engineering Applications, Heidelberg: Physica Verlag

4. Peirce C., 1982-93 Writings of C. Peirce: A Chronological Edition in Five Volumes, Manuscript 291, Eds. C. Kloestel et al., Bloomington: Indiana University Press

5. Kauffman L., 1997 Virtual Logic - Fixed Points and Paradoxes, Cybernetics and Human Knowing,4, p.65

6. Mandelbrot B., 1982 The Fractal Geometry of Nature, NY: Freeman and Co.

7. Kristeva J., 1984 Revolution in Poetic Language, NY: Colubia University Press

8. Allott, R. 1997 Language and the Origin of Semiosis, Internet publication

9. Lissak, M. and Gunz, H. (eds.) 1999 Managing Complexity in Organizations : A View in Many Directions, Quorum Books.
 
 

İnsan vücudunun mikro kozmik düzeydeki faaliyetinden, üzerinde yaşadığı dünyanın bir ölçüdeki makro kozmik faaliyetine uzanan kısa bir seyahate çıktığımızda, yaşantımızın nasıl bir kaotik sistem içerisinde oluştuğunu gözlemlememiz mümkündür. Öyle ki; kalp atışlarımızdan düşünce sistemimize, oradan da dünyamızın meteorolojik yapısına uzanan muazzam bir kaos egemenliği ile karşılaşarak şaşırabiliriz. Israrla belirtmekte fayda var ki, burada söz edilen "kaos", düzensizlik ve kargaşa anlamına gelmiyor, sadece bilim dünyasının değişik bir yapıyı açıklamak için kullandığı özel bir terim.

Bedenimizin iç yapısı ve belli başlı organlarımız üzerine yapılan bilimsel araştırmalar gösteriyor ki, tıpkı doğanın diğer birçok atom altı sistemlerinde olduğu gibi, insan bedeni de kaotik sistemlerle işlemektedir. Örneğin, insan beyninin çalışma sistemini incelemek için yapılan araştırmalar, düşünce faaliyetinin artışıyla beyin dalgalarının giderek kaotik bir yapıya büründüklerini gösteriyor. Beyin dalgaları, nöronların ateşlenmesi ile ortaya çıkan elektrik sinyalleridir. Beyin dalgaları, deneklerin elektro ansefalografa bağlanması ve bu aletin ekranında çizgilerin belirmesiyle tespit edilmektedir.

BEYİN KASIRGALAR OKYANUSU

İnsan beyni adeta bir kasırgalar okyanusu gibidir. Düşünme derecesi arttıkça kasırgaların şiddeti artar ve giderek karmaşık bir görünüm sergilemeye başlarlar. Beyindeki bu kaotik işlemler bütünlüğünü anlamak için yapılan deneylerden biri de şudur:

Bu çalışmada denekler önce elektro ansefalografa bağlanıyorlar, kendilerinden hiçbir şey düşünmemeleri isteniyor ve beyin dalgaları kaydediliyor. Daha sonra deneklerden 700'den geriye doğru yedişer yedişer saymaları isteniyor ve beyin dalgaları kaydediliyor. Görülüyor ki, geriye sayarak düşünen deneklerin beyin dalgalarının elektro ansefalograf (EEG) çizgileri dinamik artışlar kaydediyor ve giderek önceden tahmin edilmesi imkansız bir akış içine giriyorlar.

Bunun gibi, bu konuda yapılan başka bir araştırmaların sonuçları da çok ilginçtir. Bu deneyde sara hastalarının kriz durumundaki EEG çizgileri kaydedilmiş ve normal insanların EEG çizgileriyle karşılaştırılmış. Ortaya çıkan sonuç son derece ilginç: Sara krizi sırasında beyin dalgaları daha düzenli ve periyodik bir hal almaktadır.

Bu tür deneyler bilim adamlarına, beynin asli düzeninin kaotik olduğu ve ancak hastalıklı gibi olağanüstü durumlarda, düşünce akışının düzenli bir hale büründüğünü göstermiş oldu.

Beyin üzerinde yapılan deneylerin dışında, kalple ilgili olarak yapılan araştırmalarda, sağlıklı bir kalbin vuruş düzensizliğinin, sağlıksız olan bir kalbe göre daha kaotik olduğu gözlemlendi. Bu araştırmalara göre, sağlıklı bir kalp, vuruşlarını belirli bir aralıktaki frekanslar içerisinde devamlı olarak değiştirmektedir. Kalp yaşlanıp, hastalanmaya başladıkça vuruşlar düzensizliğini kaybedip daha periyodik olmaktadır.

BEDENDEKİ KAOTİK ETKİ

Bedenimizde varolan kaotik sistemi iyi anlaşılırsa bazı temel bilgiler yerli yerine oturabilir. Peki ama beynimiz ya da kalbimiz neden kaosa gerek duyuyor? "Sağlıklı olmak için" diye yanıtlıyor, bu konu üzerinde çalışan Ary Goldberger ve ekliyor:

"Çevrenizdeki şartlar sizi değişik hareketler yapmaya zorluyor. Eğer siz periyodik ve monoton bir dinamiğe sahipseniz, çevrenizdeki düzensizliğe uyum sağlayamazsınız. Çevreye uyabilmenin ve gerekli esnekliğe sahip olmanın tek yolu kaostur. Kaos; düzenli, kontrollü bir düzensizlik içerir." ilginç değil mi?

Her ne kadar burada araştırmacının söyledikleri kendi öznel düşüncelerini yansıtıyorsa da, yine de gelecekte kaos üzerine yapılacak araştırmaların gündelik hayatımıza dek inebilecek etkilerini şimdiden tahmin edebilmemizi kolaylaştırmaktadır. Ünlü düşünür Fritjof Capra ise "Dönüm Noktası" adlı kitabında bu konuda söylüyor:

"Sağlığa sistemler açısından bakış, hayata sistemler açısından bakışa bağlıdır. Gördüğümüz üzere, canlı organizmalar yüksek derecede bir kararlılığa sahip, kendi kendini organize eden sistemlerdir. Söz konusu kararlılık tamamen dinamik olup kesintisiz, birden fazla ve birbirine bağlı dalgalanmalarla ifade edilmiştir. Böyle bir sistemin sağlıklı olabilmesi için çevresiyle etkileşimde bulunması, çok sayıda seçme hakkına sahip ve esnek olması gerekmektedir. Bir sistemin esnekliği, hoşgörü sınırları içinde ne kadar çok değişkenin dalgalanıp durduğuna bağlıdır. Daha dinamik bir organizma grubu, esnekliğinin de artmasını gerektirir. Esnekliğin doğası ne olursa olsun, fiziksel, ruhsal, toplumsal, teknolojik ya da ekonomik o sistemlerin, çevrenin değişmelerine uyarlanma yetenekleri için esastır. Esnekliğin yitirilmesi sağlığın yitirilmesi anlamına gelir."

Fritjof Capra'nın görüşlerine katılalım ya da katılmayalım, bu, esneklik ve uyumun gelecekte oldukça ilginç araştırmalara konu olacağı gerçeğini değiştirmiyor.

"Anlaşıldığı kadarıyla doğanın dinamikleri hakkında öğreneceğimiz daha çok şey var."

Kaynak: http://www.astroset.com/yasam/metafor/metafor15.htm

Kuantum kuramının getirmiş olduğu yeni bakış açısı klasik fizik kavramlarına ters düşen bir yaklaşım içerir. Bu yeni bakış açısı yeni bir paradigma olarak görülmelidir. Yeni paradigmalar ise ancak eski paradigmaların geçersiz veya yetersiz oldukları durumlarda ortaya çıkarlar.

Eski (klasik fizik dünya görüşü) paradigmaları hangi noktalarda yetersiz kalmıştır? Bu soruyu yanıtlamak için 18 ve 19. yüzyıllarda ortaya atılan birtakım varsayımlara bakmak gerekir. Bu varsayımlar sanki birer “evrensel gerçek” veya “tartışmasız kabul edilmesi gereken ilke” oldukları inancı içinde tüm dünyada ve özellikle bilim çevrelerinde kabul görmüşlerdir.

Esas itibariyle 4 adet temel varsayım vardır.

1. Nesnellik (objectivity)

2. Pozitifçilik (pozitivism)

3. Yerellik (locality) ve

4. İndirgeyicilik (reductionizm) .

Nesnellik: Evrenin birbirlerinden kopuk nesnelerden oluşmuş olduğu varsayımı. Böylece nesneleri çevrelerinden yalıtıp inceleyerek özelliklerini belirlemenin mümkün olduğu inancı.

Pozitiflik: Evrenin ölçülebilir olduğu varsayımı. Böylece her türlü bilimsel yaklaşımın sayılara dökülerek ifade edilebileceği inancı.

Yerellik: Etkileşimlerin sadece yerel nedenlere dayalı oldukları varsayımı. Böylece uzaktan ve anında etkilerin bulunamayacağı inancı.

İndirgeyicilik: Nesneleri anlamak için onları bölüp parçalamanın gerekli olduğu varsayımı. Böylece en temel yapı taşlarına ulaşılabileceği inancı.

Günümüzde tüm bilimsel çabalar bu dört varsayıma dayanarak sürdürülüyor. Bu yaklaşım teknik ve teknolojinin gelişmesinde büyük yarar sağlamıştır. Bu yarara bakarak bilim çevrelerinde büyük bir özgüven gelişmiş ve bu varsayımlar tartışılmaz tabulara dönüşmüşlerdir.

Oysa ki tüm çabalara rağmen ve elde edilmiş birçok başarıya rağmen bu varsayımların geçersiz olduklarını ileri süren bir fizik kuramı gelişmiş ve deneysel olarak da doğruluğu defalarca kanıtlanmıştır.

Bu kuram Kuantum Kuramıdır.

Bu kurama göre yukarda belirtilen 4 varsayımın her biri tartışılır hale gelmiştir. Nesnellik varsayımı Kuantum kuramında geçerli değildir. Her nesne aynı zamanda dalgasal bir yapı olduğundan artık birbirlerinden kopuk ve bağımsız nesnelerden söz edilemez.

Pozitiflik varsayımı da tartışma konusudur. Kuantum kuramına göre gözleyen ve gözlenen birbirinden ayrı ve bağımsız değildir. Bu etkileşim bağımsız ölçüm yapmayı da şüpheli hale dönüştürmüştür. Mikro alemde ölçüm yaparken ölçülen nesne özellik değiştirmekte ve bu bakımdan ele geçen veriler o nesneyi tanımlamakta yetersiz kalmaktadırlar. Aynı sorunla insan-insan ilişkilerinde de karşılaşıyoruz.

Yerellik varsayımı Newton fiziğinde de yoktur. Kuvvetler uzaktan ve anında etki edebilmektedirler. Daha sonra Einstein ışık hızının bir üst limit hız olduğunu iddia ederek yerellik varsayımını güçlendirmiştir. Ancak etkilerin ışık hızından daha yüksek hızlarda oluşabileceği ve bütünsel ilişkilerin bulunabileceği Kuantum kuramı tarafından ileri sürülmüş ve deneylerle kanıtlanmıştır. Bu kurama göre “Eğer bir yapı başlangıçta bir bütün oluşturmuş ise, o yapıyı parçalasanız dahi parçalar arasında etkileşim yerel olmayan bir biçimde devam eder.” Bu görüş hem nesnellik varsayımını hem de yerellik varsayımını yıkmaktadır.

Böylece son varsayım olan indirgeyicilik varsayımı da yıkılmaktadır. Çünkü bir bütün istendiği kadar parçalara bölünüp indirgensin yine de parçalar arası iletişim, ışık hızından daha hızlı bir şekilde gerçekleşmeye devam etmektedir.

Bu durumda artık eski varsayımlar yetersiz kalmakta olup yeni bir dünya görüşünün gerekli olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Zaten günümüzde var olan dünya sorunları göz önüne alındığında yeni bir paradigmanın gerekli olduğu da kaçınılmaz olarak belirmektedir. Sorunun temelinde yatan bizim ikilemli dünya görüşümüzdür.

Günümüzün modern bilimi varlığın bölünmez bütünsel bir teklik olduğunu kabul etmektedir. Her nesnenin hem parçacık hem dalga oluşu, kendi başına, her üç varsayımı sorgulamanın ilk adımını oluşturmuştur. Doğayı kesin ve determinist bir yaklaşımla anlamak mümkün değildir. Çünkü doğada kesikli değişimler ve belirsizlik içeren bir karmaşa vardır. Ancak, bu karmaşa nesnelerin ve olayların dış görünüşü ile ilgilidir. Dış görünüşte görelilik vardır. Fakat insan, bir tin beden bütünlüğü olduğuna göre sadece doğayı değil, aynı zamanda kendini ve kendi kaynağını da anlama gayreti içindedir. Kendini anlamak ise doğayı anlamaktan daha zor ve daha çetin bir uğraştır. Bu uğraşa bir ad koymak gerekirse kısaca “Farkındalık” demeyi uygun görüyorum. Farkındalık bir bakıma, kaynağa ulaşma çabasıdır.

Modern bilim kuramlarının getirdiği farklı görüşlerin yerleşmesi için klasik yapının bozulması gerekir. Bu durum Fransız felsefeci Jacques Derrida’nın meşhur ettiği “Yapı bozumculuğu” kavramı ile ilgilidir.

 “Yapı bozumculuğu” yıkım değildir, analiz hiç değildir. Daha çok batı düşünce sisteminin klasik kavramlarını yeniden ve güncel bilimin ışığı altında yorumlamak için başvurulan bir bakıştır.

Bu bakımdan hem Aristo mantığının kabullerini hem de batı felsefesinin temel varsayımlarını yeniden yapılandırmak gerekmektedir. Derrida’nın esas saldırı hedefi ikili (karşıt) kavramlardır. Kuantum kuramının yaklaşımı, Aristo mantığının ikili yaklaşımının yetersiz olduğu göstermiştir. Kuantum kuramının yeni yaklaşımında şu tercihler öncelik kazanıyor:

Gözlem yerine katılım,

Anlamsız yerine anlam,

Bağımsız yerine bütünsel

Nesne yerine enerji,

Burada gözlemden vazgeçelim demiyorum. Ancak, her gözlemin belli bir ölçüde katılım içerdiğini bilmek ve bunun farkındalığı içinde olayları ve durumları anlamlandırmak gerektiğini savunuyorum. Farkındalık ancak katılım sayesinde güçlenebilir. Farkındalık arttıkça ikilemli mantığın kısıtlayıcı yapısını bozmak ve dolayısıyla yeni bir anlayışa ulaşmak mümkün olabilir.

Böylece gündelik yaşam içinde bakış açımızı nesnellikten ve yerellikten kurtarıp, bütünselliğe ve tümel birliğe doğru yöneltmeyi gerçekleştirebiliriz. Olayları incelerken onları parçalara ayırıp indirgemek yerine onları en geniş açıdan değerlendirerek tümel bir bakış açısı ile bütünsel olarak incelemeyi başarabilmeliyiz. Ayrıca, her olayı veya olguyu sayısal olarak ifade etmeye çalışmak yerine, sezgi içeren bakış açılarını küçümsemeden düşünce yapımızı genişletmeye gayret etmeliyiz.

Doç. Dr. Haluk Berkmen

                                                                            

http://www.astroset.com/yasam/metafor.htm

David Swartz

This essay examines key features of Pierre Bourdieu's sociology of culture in light of their potential contribution to the sociology of religion. Bourdieu himself has devoted little attention to the study of religion.(1) Yet, significant features of his approach to the study of culture find inspiration in the materialism of Karl Marx and particularly in Max Weber's sociology of religion.

BOURDIEU'S POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SYMBOLIC POWER

Bourdieu proposes a sociology of symbolic power in which he addresses the important topic of relations between culture, stratification, and power. He contends that the struggle for social recognition is a fundamental dimension of all social life. In that struggle, cultural resources, processes, and institutions hold individuals and groups in competitive and self-perpetuating hierarchies of domination. He advances the bold claim that all cultural symbols and practices, ranging from artistic tastes, style in dress, and eating habits to religion, science, and philosophy - indeed to language itself - embody interests and function to enhance social distinctions. Bourdieu focuses on how these social struggles are refracted through symbolic classifications, how cultural practices place individuals and groups into competitive class and status hierarchies, how relatively autonomous fields of conflict interlock individuals and groups in struggle over valued resources, how actors struggle and pursue strategies to achieve their interests within such fields, and how in doing so actors unwittingly reproduce the social stratification order. Culture, then, is not devoid of political content but rather is an expression of it.

In his approach to culture, Bourdieu develops a political economy of symbolic practices that includes a theory of symbolic interests, a theory of cultural capital, and a theory of symbolic power. These are not tidy, well-delimited theoretical arguments but orienting themes that overlap and interpenetrate. They draw from a wide variety of intellectual influences including Marxism, structuralism, and phenomonology. But as Brubaker (1985) points out, Max Weber is the most importance influence from the classical sociological tradition on Bourdieu's work. It is impossible to probe the full complexity of these theories or to cover the full range of Bourdieu's conceptual innovations in this short essay.(2) Nonetheless, it is possible to show how Bourdieu draws from Marx and from Weber's sociology of religion to develop a sociology of cultural practices.

TRANSCENDING IDEALISM AND MATERIALISM

At the core of Bourdieu's intellectual project for over thirty years stands the central question in Western social thought since Marx: the debate between cultural idealism and historical materialism. Bourdieu's sociology represents a bold attempt to find a middle road that transcends the classic idealism/materialism bipolarity by proposing a materialist yet non-reductive account of cultural life. His thinking begins with Marx but draws more substantively from Weber.(3)

Marx

Like Marx, Bourdieu emphasizes the primacy of conflict and class-based social inequality in modern societies. Yet, he is sharply critical of class reductionist accounts of religious and cultural life. Bourdieu is a materialist in the sense that he roots human consciousness in practical social life. He is also concerned with forms of false consciousness or, in his terms, "mis-recognition" of power relations. He accepts the Marxian idea that symbolic systems fulfill social functions of domination and reproduction of class inequality. Yet he is critical of the view of ideology that focuses largely on the social functions of symbolic goods and practices without showing how they are necessary features for the enactment of social practices.

While Bourdieu accepts the Marxist claim that religion is ideology, he resists separating out the symbolic dimension of social life as separate and derivative of the more fundamental material components of social life. In short, he rejects the Marxist infrastructure/superstructure conceptual distinction as rooted in the classic idealism/materialism dichotomy that Bourdieu believes must be transcended. Here Bourdieu parts company with the structuralist Marxism of Louis Althusser (1970), which was one of Bourdieu's important intellectual references in the 1960s and 1970s. Bourdieu shares Althusser's basic materialist outlook and his emphasis on the relative autonomy of religion and culture from politics and economics. Still, Bourdieu's position is not fundamentally Althusserian. Inspired by Marx's first thesis on Feuerbach, which emphasizes the underlying unity of all social life as practical activity, Bourdieu (1984a:467) rejects the idea that social existence can be segmented and hierarchically organized into distinct spheres, such as the social, the cultural, and the economic. Rather than explore the various forms of articulation of the superstructure and infrastructure as Althusserians do, Bourdieu argues that the two realms are not to be separated in the first place. Bourdieu seeks to write a general science of practices that combines the material and symbolic dimensions and thereby emphasizes the fundamental unity of social life. Nonetheless, Bourdieu's central concern with the problem of relations between the symbolic and material aspects of social life and between structure and agency stem in part from his early confrontations with this particular Marxist tradition.

Weber

From Marx, Bourdieu turns to Max Weber for the conceptual tools to elaborate a theory of symbolic goods and practices that would transcend both class reductionism and idealism. Bourdieu remarks that it is Max Weber "who, far from opposing Marx, as is generally thought, with a spiritualist theory of history, in fact carries the materialist mode of thought into areas which Marxist materialism effectively abandons to spiritualism" (1990b:17). Bourdieu sees Weber offering a "political economy of religion" that brings "out the full potential of the materialist analysis of religion without destroying the properly symbolic character of the phenomenon" (1990a:36). One central objective of Bourdieu's sociology is to elaborate Weber's model for a political economy of religion to all of cultural and social life. Indeed, Bourdieu sees his sociology of culture to be of the same character as that of Weber who used "the economic model to extend materialist critique into the realm of religion" (1990a:107). It is to be a "generalized" or "radical" materialism, but one that avoids the class reductionism that Bourdieu (1990b:17; 1993:12) believes characterizes Marxism. Bourdieu believes he has found in this generalized materialism a way to transcend the classic idealism/materialism dichotomy in the social sciences.

SYMBOLIC INTERESTS

Bourdieu's work represents an important elaboration of Max Weber's notion of ideal goods and interests (Gerth and Mills 1970:280). The idea of "religious interest" comes from Weber's emphasis on the "this-worldly" character of behavior motivated by religious belief. Weber writes that "the most elementar0y forms of behavior motivated by religious or magical factors are oriented to this world" (1978:399). He goes on to stress that "religious or magical behavior or thinking must not be set apart from the range of everyday purposive conduct, particularly since even the ends of the religious and magical actions are predominantly economic" (Weber 1978:400). Bourdieu argues that by insisting on the "this-worldly" character of behavior motivated by religious factors Weber provides a "way of linking the contents of mythical discourse (and even its syntax) to the religious interests of those who produce it, diffuse it, and receive it" (1990b:4). Thus, Weber provides a means for connecting religious beliefs and practices to the interests of those who produce and administer them.

Bourdieu (1987c:122), however, considers Weber's notion of "religious interest" to be "only weakly elaborated" since it limits the scope of interest to be "determined by the agents' conditions of existence." By contrast, Bourdieu stresses that religious interests - and symbolic interests more generally - "are also determined in their form and their conditions of expression by the supply of religion and the action of the religious professionals." Nonetheless, Weber's thinking permits one to construct the

system of religious beliefs and practices as the . . . transfigured expression of the strategies of different categories of specialists competing for monopoly over the administration of the goods of salvation and of the different classes interested in their services (Bourdieu 1991a:4).

Bourdieu extends the idea of interest to include non-material goods by arguing that all practices are fundamentally "interested" whether directed toward material or symbolic items. He extends the logic of economic calculation to "all goods, material and symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after in a particular social formation" (1977: 178). Bourdieu wants to construct "a general theory of the economy of practices" that will analyze "all practices" as "aimed at maximizing material or symbolic profit" (1990b:209). The research program he proposes would unite what has traditionally been thought of as economic (i.e., interested and material) and non-economic (i.e., disinterested and symbolic) forms of action and objects. Thus, symbolic interest and material interest are viewed as two equally objective forms of interest. Actors pursue symbolic as well as material interests and exchange one for the other under specified conditions.

While extending the idea of interest from material to ideal goods, Weber nonetheless retains analytical distinctions for different types of behavior. Weber (1978:24-25,339) analytically distinguishes the following types of action: "instrumentally rational," "value-rational," "affectional," and "traditional." Weber does not consider every instrumental action as economic. To be economic, action must satisfy a need that depends upon relatively scarce resources and a limited number of actions. Such distinctions disappear altogether in Bourdieu's work. Moreover, the idea that action is interest-oriented is for Bourdieu a fundamental presupposition not a hypothesis for testing. And he does not consider whether some practices might be more self-interested than others.

Despite the economic language, Bourdieu sees his generalized materialism as quite distinct from economism since his perspective views material utilitarianism as but one form of the more generalized pursuit of interest. Thus he claims to be writing a "general science of the economy of practices" of which the "science of economic practices is but a particular case" of the more general program (Bourdieu 1977:183). He sharply distinguishes his own economy of practices from rational actor theory. The interest-orientation of practices for Bourdieu does not imply a formal or conscious calculation of costs and benefits. Rather, practices occur for the most part at a tacit, dispositional, and pre-reflective level that reflects past accumulation through early socialization of various advantages and disadvantages associated with social class background. He sharply contrasts his view of action as dispositional with the two radically opposing views that depict action as flowing either from rational calculation or from structural determination.(4)

CULTURAL CAPITAL

The extension of Weber's idea of religious interest permits Bourdieu to develop concepts such as "religious capital" and "cultural capital" as irreducible forms of power though interchangeable with economic capital. Bourdieu conceptualizes resources as capital when they function as a "social relation of power" (1989:375) by becoming objects of struggle as valued resources. Bourdieu's concept of "religious capital" (1991a:9) is close to Weber's idea of religious "qualification." It represents "accumulated symbolic labor" and is connected to the "constitution of a religious field" where a group of religious specialists is able to monopolize the administration of religious goods and services. Religious capital is a power resource since it implies a form of "objective dispossession" through constituting a "laity" who by definition are those without, yet want, the valued resource controlled by specialists. Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital covers a wide variety of resources, such as verbal facility, general cultural awareness, aesthetic preferences, scientific knowledge, and educational credentials. His point is to suggest that culture (in the broadest sense of the term) can become a power resource.

Bourdieu thus builds a case for the irreducible character of cultural representations as forms of power by extending the logic of self-interest to the non-material sphere where he identifies prestige, honor, knowledge, and educational credentials as forms of capital. According to Bourdieu, actors pursue investment strategies in cultural goods just as they do with economic goods. Individuals, families, and groups can accumulate cultural as well as economic items. Moreover, privilege and prestige can be transmitted intergenerationally through forms of cultural capital. Families who invest in the higher education of their children pursue a cultural form of investment in order to maintain or enhance the material conditions of their offspring. Thus Bourdieu finds it useful to think of valued non-material resources as forms of capital to the extent they can be accumulated, exchanged, and invested for profits. An important task for sociology, Bourdieu argues, is to explore the production, circulation, and consumption of the various forms of cultural and economic capital. Under what conditions and at what rates do these distinct forms of capital become mutually convertible forms of power?

Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital needs to be distinguished from Gary Becker's (1976) concept of "human capital." Unlike human capital theorists, Bourdieu focuses on the class-based variation both in the meanings and uses of the various types of capital. Moreover, Bourdieu's theory of human action as suggested by his concept of habitus does not share the anthropological assumptions of a rational actor perspective. Bourdieu's actors pursue strategies but not as conscious maximizers of limited means to achieve desired ends. Their "choices" are tacit, practical, and dispositional, reflecting the encounter between their accumulated capital and corresponding dispositions from past socialization and the present opportunities and constraints of fields where they act.

Bourdieu's concepts of symbolic interest and capital also need to be distinguished from Ann Swidler's (1986) "tool kit" view of cultural practices. Though similar in stressing agency and the practical features of culture rather than norms and values, Bourdieu is less voluntaristic than Swidler; he stresses the group embeddedness of individual action. Moreover, Bourdieu stresses more than Swidler the power dimension of cultural resources, their capacity to constitute social hierarchies.

SYMBOLIC POWER

Bourdieu draws from Max Weber's notions of charisma and legitimacy to develop a theory of symbolic power.(5) This theory stresses the active role played by taken-for-granted assumptions in the constitution and maintenance of power relations. Like Weber, Bourdieu contends that the exercise of power requires legitimation. Bourdieu argues that the logic of self-interest underlying all practices - particularly those in the cultural domain - goes "mis-recognized" as a logic of "disinterest." "Misrecognition" is a important concept for Bourdieu; akin to the idea of "false consciousness" in the Marxist tradition, misrecognition denotes "denial" of the economic and political interests present in a set of practices. Symbolic practices, Bourdieu thus argues, deflect attention from the interested character of practices and thereby contribute to their enactment as disinterested pursuits. Activities and resources gain in symbolic power, or legitimacy, to the extent that they become separated from underlying material interests and hence go misrecognized as representing disinterested forms of activities and resources. Individuals and groups who are able to benefit from the transformation of self-interest into disinterest obtain what Bourdieu calls a "symbolic capital" (see 1972:227-243, 1977:171-83, 1990b:112-21, 1991b:163-170). Symbolic capital is "denied capital;"(6) it disguises the underlying "interested" relations to which it is related, giving them legitimation. Symbolic capital is a form of power that is not perceived as power but as legitimate demands for recognition, deference, obedience, or the services of others.

Symbolic Labor

For Bourdieu, the focus by Weber on religious producers provides the key for understanding how relations of interest become transformed into disinterested relations to create symbolic capital. It is the "symbolic labor" by specialists that transforms relations of power into forms of disinterested honorability (Bourdieu 1977:171). Bourdieu (1987c:122-124, 1991a:5-13) highlights as particularly insightful Weber's (1978:1177-1181) analysis of the "ethicalization" and "systematization" of religious needs of the rising urban bourgeoisie as the product of religious labor by specialists. Religious labor by specialists creates religious understandings of the particular social conditions of existence of specific groups. Symbolic labor produces symbolic power by transforming relations of interest into disinterested meanings.

Bourdieu therefore assigns an important role to symbolic producers (e.g., artists, writers, teachers, journalists, and clergy) in legitimating the social order by producing symbolic capital through symbolic labor. This of course is the role Marx assigned to ideology, but by stressing symbolic labor Bourdieu wishes to emphasize that ideology is not a given but requires active construction. Moreover, Bourdieu contends that most everyday practices would not be possible without misrecognition of their objective interests. The exchange of gifts, for example, would be transformed into a financial transaction if there were not some degree of misrecognition of their objective interests. Thus symbolic power appears as an inseparable dimension of practices. Though Bourdieu employs a language of economics; his emphasis on the necessity for symbolic power in practices distinguishes his position from a thoroughly utilitarian perspective.

FIELDS OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION

If cultural, symbolic, and economic capital are distinct though mutually convertible forms of power, they nonetheless follow distinct modes of accumulation and operation. As forms of cultural production develop, they generate arenas of struggle by specialists for the monopoly over their administration. To account for this dimension of his political economy of symbolic power in modern differentiated societies, Bourdieu develops the concept of "field" (champ). Fields designate arenas where specific forms of capital are produced, invested, exchanged, and accumulated.

The concept of field emerges from the conjuncture in the late 1960s between Bourdieu's research in the sociology of art and his reading of Weber's sociology of religion (Bourdieu 1987a:33).(7) The concept is inspired by Weber's discussion of the relations between priest, prophet, and sorcerer (Bourdieu 1990a:49).(8) Weber identifies the specific and opposing interests of these principal types of religious leadership and the structures of the "competition which opposes them to one another" (Bourdieu 1990a:107). Bourdieu (1987c; 1992:260) proposes a structuralist reinterpretation of Weber's analysis by stressing how the interactions between the types of religious leadership are structured by their opposing interests and how these interests are in turn related to broader power structures. Bourdieu (1987c:121) considers Weber's analysis restricted to an "interactionist" perspective focused on inter-personal or inter-subjective relations among actors. A field perspective, however, introduces a broader perspective of structural conditions that shape the interactions of actors though they are not aware of them. Bourdieu (1971b, 1971a, 1985, 1992:260) first applied the concept to French artists and intellectuals as a means to call attention to the specific interests governing those cultural worlds.

Field has become a key spatial metaphor in Bourdieu's sociology of culture. Bourdieu defines a field as

a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined . . . by their present and potential situation . . . in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field (1992:97).

Fields may be thought of as structured spaces that are organized around specific types of capital.(9) Fields denote arenas of production, circulation, and appropriation of goods, services, knowledge, or status, and the competitive positions held by actors in their struggle to accumulate and monopolize different kinds of capital. For example, Bourdieu speaks of the "intellectual field" to designate that matrix of institutions, organizations, and markets in which artists and writers compete for the symbolic capital of legitimate recognition for their artistic and literary work. Field is a more inclusive concept than market; as a spatial metaphor it suggests rank and hierarchy as well as exchange relations between buyers and sellers. Indeed, Bourdieu's concept of field should not be reduced to the neo-classic idea of market. Rather, the concept suggests a force-field where the distribution of capital reflects a hierarchical set of power relations among the competing individuals, groups, and organizations. Interactions among actors within fields are shaped by their relative location in the hierarchy of positions. Bourdieu has applied this concept in studies of social class lifestyles, higher education institutions, science, culture, law, and religion.

Bourdieu (1985) uses field analysis to offer a cultural-structural interpretation of the rise of cultural markets and the modern intelligentsia. Field analysis posits a parallel process: As corps of cultural producers emerge, specialized and institutionalized cultural arenas of production, circulation, and consumption of symbolic goods also emerge with increasing autonomy from the economy and the polity. Bourdieu's basic research hypothesis in field analysis is that as cultural fields gain in autonomy from external factors, the intellectual stances assumed by the agents increasingly become a function of the positions occupied by the agents within these fields. Thus, in contrast to Marxist class analysis, Bourdieu sees fields as mediating relations between social structures and cultural life.

Structural Properties of Fields

Bourdieu (1993:72) speaks of the "invariant laws" or "universal mechanisms" that are structural properties characteristic of all fields. First, fields are arenas of struggle for control over valued resources, or forms of capital. Field struggle centers around particular forms of capital, such as economic capital, cultural capital, scientific capital, or religious capital. Cultural capital, for example, is the key property in the intellectual field whereas economic capital is the important property in the business world. There are as many fields as there are capitals. Actors also struggle over the very definitions of what are to be considered the most valued resources in fields. This is particularly true in cultural fields where style and knowledge rapidly change. In other words, fields are arenas of struggle for legitimation: in Bourdieu's language, for the right to monopolize the exercise of "symbolic violence."

Second, fields are structured spaces of dominant and subordinate positions based on types and amounts of capital. Field struggle pits those in subordinate positions against those in superordinate positions. The struggle for position in fields opposes those who are able to exercise some degree of monopoly power over the definition and distribution of capital against those who attempt to usurp those advantages. In general, Bourdieu sees this opposition occurring between the established agents and the new arrivals in fields. Drawing from Weber's description of the opposition between priests and prophets, Bourdieu depicts this conflict in terms of those who defend orthodoxy against those who advocate heresy. For Bourdieu (1992:289), this fundamental structure of conflict is paradigmatic not only in the religious field but in all cultural fields. The orthodox/heterodox opposition is a struggle for the

monopoly of cultural legitimacy and the right to withhold and confer this consecration in the name of fundamentally opposed principles: the personal authority called for by the creator and the institutional authority favoured by the teacher (1971b:178).

Bourdieu sees an analogous opposition in intellectual fields, particularly in academe, between the "curators of culture" and the "creators of culture," between those who reproduce and transmit legitimate bodies of knowledge and those who invent new forms of knowledge. In his study of the Parisian university faculty, Bourdieu (1988) finds this fundamental opposition between teachers and researchers, between professors and independent intellectuals. In the field of religion, an analogous opposition might be found between denominational administrators and clergy, on the one hand, and sociologists of religion and theologians, on the other hand.

Crucial for Bourdieu in his field analysis is that the two opposing strategies ate dialectically related; one generates the other. Orthodoxies call into existence their heterodox reversals by the logic of distinction that operates in cultural fields.(10) Challengers oblige the old guard to mount a defense of its privileges; that defense, then, becomes grounds for subversion.

Third, fields impose on actors specific forms of struggle. Entry into a field requires a tacit acceptance of the rules of the game, meaning that specific forms of struggle are legitimated whereas others are excluded. Both the dominant establishment and the subordinate challengers share a tacit acceptance that the field of struggle is worth pursuing in the first place. Bourdieu refers to this deep structure of fields as the Doxa for it represents a tacit, fundamental agreement on the stakes of struggle between those advocating heterodoxy and those holding to orthodoxy.(11) Challengers and incumbents share a common interest in preserving the field itself even if they are sharply divided on how it is to be controlled.(12) In the sociology of religion, for example, contemporary debates occur over the trends and significance of religious life; all assume - including the proponents of secularization - that religion is worth talking about in the first place.

Fourth, fields are structured to a significant extent by their own internal mechanisms of development and thus hold some degree of autonomy from the external environment. The "relative autonomy" of the educational system, for example, as of most institutionalized religions, refers to its capacity to control the recruitment, socialization, and careers of actors, and to impose its own specific ideology. More generally, Bourdieu points to the relative autonomy of cultural fields from economic and political fields. A scholarly discipline such as the sociology of religion, for example, will reflect to some extent broader intellectual trends. But it also has its own particular history and structure that new arrivals need to appropriate in order to gain recognition as members of the field.

Field analysis, therefore, directs the researcher's attention to a level of analysis capable of revealing the integrating logic of competition between opposing viewpoints. It encourages the researcher to seek out sources of conflict in a given domain, relate that conflict to the broader areas of class and power, and identify underlying shared assumptions by opposing parties. Field analysis directs attention to the task of identifying the principal poles of opposition and their underlying shared assumptions in a particular domain.

Finally, a fundamental methodological principle flows from the posited relative autonomy of fields; namely, priority is given to the internal analysis of fields. Bourdieu argues that external influences are always "retranslated" into the internal logic of fields. External sources of influence are always mediated through the structure and dynamic of fields. The class background of the artist, for example, does not influence the work of art directly. Rather, the effects of class intersect with the patterns of field hierarchy and conflict where the artist is situated (Bourdieu 1984b:6).

Structural Homologies

Bourdieu conceptualizes the relations among relatively autonomous fields in terms of "structural and functional homologies," which he defines as "a resemblance within a difference" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:105-106). Fields become homologous to the extent that they develop isomorphic properties such as positions of dominance and subordination, strategies of exclusion and usurpation, and mechanisms of reproduction and change. In his early work on French education, Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977:63-64, 194-200) stresses the "structural and functional" homology between French education and the medieval Catholic Church: schools, like the Church, not only transmit knowledge and skills but also reproduce themselves by monopolizing the selection and training of their own leadership. Moreover, like the Church, schools also reproduce social class relations by legitimating the unequal distribution of cultural capital.

Field analysis for Bourdieu differs from a market approach to culture. Though Bourdieu superficially resembles a growing number of social scientists who use economic imagery in their analytical language (Warner 1993:1051), he does not work within a rational choice framework. Field analysis does not analyze the economics of culture in terms of a direct effect of demand on supply or of supply on demand. For Bourdieu, cultural tastes are not simply imposed by cultural producers on unwitting consumers; nor do cultural tastes stem from cultural producers attempting to respond directly to patterns of consumer demand. Field analysis posits that the relation between supply and demand, between cultural producers and their public, and more generally, between the field of cultural production and the field of social classes, is mediated by field structures and struggles. Thus, patterns and changes in cultural production are to be analyzed in terms of the competitive struggle among cultural producers in which newcomers challenge established groups for the right to define what are to be legitimate cultural forms. Producers struggle within the field of cultural production and their cultural products reflect more their respective positions of dominance or subordination than they do the demands of consumers.

Consumers, in turn, select from these products according to their own positions of dominance or subordination within the struggle for distinction among the social classes. Consumers in subordinate positions tend to select products produced by producers in subordinate positions within the field of cultural production. Thus a relation of "structural homology" rather than one of conscious adjustment is established between the various categories of cultural producers and the various categories of consumers according to their respective positions in the separate fields of struggle. Bourdieu writes:

The logic of objective competition at the core of the field of cultural production leads each of the categories of producers to offer, without any conscious search for adjustment, products that are adjusted to the preferences of the consumers who occupy homologous positions within the field of power (1984b:14).

DISCUSSION

Bourdieu brings a conflict perspective to the study of religion. He stresses the power dimension in religious life and organization. No less than other arenas of cultural and social conflict, religion is a resource of power over which some individuals, groups, and organizations feel it is important to struggle. The struggle for the right to impose the legitimate definition of religion is in the final analysis a political function. "Religious power" or "religious capital," Bourdieu writes,

depends on the material and symbolic force of the groups and classes the claimants can mobilize by offering them goods and services that satisfy their religious interests (1991a:22).(13)

Moreover, the struggle for legitimation within the religious field tends to reproduce the relations of domination within the established order (1991a:31-32).

How might one employ Bourdieu's perspective to study a religious field in North America? Since fields are defined first and foremost as arenas of struggle over the definition and distribution of specific forms of capital, the first task would be to identify relevant points of conflict. Forms of religious interest and capital are involved in a great variety of contemporary issues: theological doctrine, constitutional rights, tax exemption, abortion, school prayer, and teaching and research in universities. For some, religion is important in these issues and for others religion is irrelevant. Who participates in these struggles and what kinds of symbolic as well as material interests guide them? These questions suggest different types of struggle, different levels of analysis, and different fields. They also bring into consideration a wide variety of organizations, groups, individuals, and institutions. Foundations, universities, TV and radio stations, and political action committees as well as congregations and denominations might be considered. A field perspective would suggest that issues of doctrine, organizational structure, legal status, or intellectual respectability are matters of struggle for legitimation that involve a broad array of individuals, groups, and organizations who pursue different kinds of symbolic as well as material interests.

One fruitful area for field analysis would be the religious media. If one of the main points of field analysis is to suggest that patterns of production of religious goods and services reflect more strategies of product differentiation among producers rather than the direct effects of consumer demand, then one way of testing that hypothesis would be to study an assortment of religious publications to see to what extent their editorial policies attempt to correspond to reader demand or reflect competitive referencing and differentiation with other publications.

Finally, a popular form of study that Bourdieu's field framework would not encourage would be the case study of congregations, denominations, or religious leaders. The field analytic perspective calls for situating particular entities, whether denominations or congregations, within a broader framework of struggle over the significance of religion. Local characteristics, Bourdieu contends, cannot be fully understood sociologically without situating them within this broader perspective.

On the other hand, Bourdieu's field concept presupposes a strong clergy/lay opposition and is perhaps less useful where such an opposition does not have that formal character. The concept of religious field does not grasp the "religious dimension" of social phenomena in other social areas such as sports or politics where it is has very little connection to the historically constituted religious traditions (Hervieu-Leger 1993).

In conclusion, the growing interest in relating the sociology of culture and the sociology of religion will find inspiration in the example set by Pierre Bourdieu. Drawing in part from Weber's sociology of religion, Bourdieu offers an original approach to the study of culture, one that can be applied to religion as well. This approach gives a strong sense of agency but within a structured framework of particular interests that mediate broader effects of social class. Just as students of culture are increasingly looking to Bourdieu for insights for studying the complex relation between culture and power, so also can students of religion find similar inspiration.

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Sociology of Religion, Miami Beach, August 1993 and at the New England Religious Discussion Society, Hartford, CT, April 1995. I want to give special thanks to Rhys Williams for helpful suggestions on all the drafts of this paper and also to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on earlier version. Direct correspondence to David Swartz, 10 Magnolia Ave., Newton, MA 02158. E-mail: swarzt@harvarda.harvard.edu.

1 Bourdieu (and Martin 1982) has published one empirical investigation of religion, a study of French Catholic Bishops, and written two theoretical articles in the sociology of religion (Bourdieu 1987c, 1991a). In addition, Bourdieu (1987b, 1987d) has published two public lectures devoted to the sociology of religion. The November 1982 issue of his journal, Acres de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, was devoted to various aspects of French Catholicism.

While Bourdieu dominates the sociology of culture in France, he has had little impact on the post-World War II generation of French sociologists of religion (Dobbelaere 1987). Nonetheless, one can see growing signs of his influence on the post-sixties generation of French sociology of religion scholarship (Hervieu-Leger 1993). Bourdieu's influence in the sociology of religion has been more striking outside of France (e.g. Maduro 1982).

2 See Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) for a good comprehensive introduction to Bourdieu's work.

3 There are Durkheimian influences as well though they will not be explored in this paper.

4 This is the view of action suggested by Bourdieu's concept of "habitus."

5 The argument is laid out in Bourdieu (1971b, 1980, 1991a, 1991b: 163-170; and Passeron 1977: 171-183).

6 Bourdieu writes:

Symbolic capital, a transformed and thereby disguised form of physical economic capital, produces its proper effect inasmuch . . . as it conceals the fact that it originates in "material" forms of capital which are also, in the last analysis, the source of its effects (1977:183).

7 In developing the concept Bourdieu (1987c) draws primarily from Chapters VI and XV of Economy and Society.

8 It also parallels Weber's idea of "life-orders," which inspires Gerth and Mills's (1964) conceptualization of "institutional orders."

9 Field means a "certain structure of the distribution of a certain kind of capital" (Bourdieu 1993:91).

10 This symbolic relationship between orthodox and heterodox views brings to mind Mannheim's (1955) analysis of how ideological and utopian visions of the social world, though radically opposed in their posture toward the status quo, nonetheless become locked into a pattern of complex exchange of critiques, each to an appreciable extent determining the other.

Williams and Demerath (1991) identify a similar dynamic in their study of religion and politics. They show how logically incompatible themes of civil religion and separation of church and state can coexist and actually "enable" each other in political practice.

11 The idea of the Doxa resonates with Durkheim's concept of the "collective consciousness." A crucial difference is that Doxa is field-specific rather than representing a system of tacit understandings for the entire society.

12 Like opposing players in a card game, both share a common interest in the game though both compete to win over their opponents. Bourdieu (and Wacquant 1992:98-99) sometimes draws upon the analogy of the card game to illustrate these properties of fields. At other times he stresses that knowledge of the rules themselves represents a form of cultural capital that is unequally shared among contestants.

13 While not working within Bourdieu's framework, Demerath (1991) and Williams and Demerath (1991) have recently employed the terms "cultural power," "cultural resources," and "religious capital" in ways similar to Bourdieu. Speaking in the American context where religion resonates more as a form of authority in national culture than in France, Williams and Demerath (1991) are even more concerned than is Bourdieu with the effects that religion can have on political mobilization. They show how religious and moral argument can on occasions be successfully employed by religious leaders to redefine public economic issues into ethical and moral concerns.

REFERENCES

Althusser, L. 1970. For Marx. New York: Vintage Books.

Becker, G. 1976. The economic approach to human behavior. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1971a. Champ du pouvoir, champ intellectuel et habitus de classe. Scolies 1: 7-26.

-----. 1971b. Intellectual field and creative project. In Knowledge and control: New directions for the sociology of education, edited by M.F.D. Young, 161-188. London: Collier-Macmillan.

-----. 1972. Esquisse d'une theorie de la pratique. Precedee de trois etudes d'ethnologie kabyle. Geneva: Droz.

-----. 1977. Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

-----. 1980. The production of belief: Contribution to an economy of symbolic goods. Media, Culture, and Society 2: 261-293.

-----. 1984a. Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

-----. 1984b. Le champ litteraire: Prealables critiques et principes de methode. Lendemains 36: 5-20.

-----. 1985. The market of symbolic goods. Poetics 14(April): 13-44.

-----. 1987a. Choses dites. Paris: Les Edition de Minuit.

-----. 1987b. La dissolution du religieux. Choses dites. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit.

-----. 1987c. Legitimation and structured interests in Weber's sociology of religion. In Max Weber, rationality and irrationality, edited by S. Lash and S. Whimster, 119-136. Boston: Allen & Unwin.

-----. 1987d. Sociologues de la croyance et croyances de sociologues. Choses dites. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit.

-----. 1988. Homo academicus. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

-----. 1989. La noblesse d'etat. Grandes ecoles et esprit de corps. Paris: Les Edition de Minuit.

-----. 1990a. In other words: Essays toward a reflexive sociology. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

-----. 1990b. The logic of practice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

-----. 1991a. Genesis and structure of the religious field. Comparative Social Research 13: 1-43.

-----. 1991b. Language and symbolic power. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

-----. 1992. Les regles de l'art: Genese et structure du champ litteraire. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

-----. 1993. Sociology in question. London: Sage Publications.

Bourdieu, P., and M. de S. Martin 1982. La sainte famille. L'episcopat francais dans le champ du pouvoir. Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 44/45: 2-53.

Bourdieu, P., and J.-C. Passeron 1977. Reproduction in education, society, and culture. London: Sage.

Bourdieu, P., and L. J. D. Wacquant 1992. An invitation to reflexive sociology. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Brubaker, R. 1985. Rethinking classical sociology: The sociological vision of Pierre Bourdieu. Theory and Society 14: 745-775.

Demerath, N. J. III. 1991. Religious capital and capital religions: Cross-cultural and non-legal factors in the separation of church and state. Daedalus 120: 21-40.

Dobbelaere, K. 1987. Some trends in European sociology of religion: The secularization debate. Sociological Analysis 48: 107-137.

Gerth, H. H., and C. W. Mills. 1964. Character and social structure. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

-----. 1970. From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hervieu-Leger, D. 1993. La religion pour memoire. Paris: Les Editions du Cerf.

Maduro, O. 1982. Religion and social conflicts. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Mannheim, K. 1955. Ideology and utopia: An introduction to the sociology of knowledge. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

Swidler, A. 1986. Culture in action: Symbols and strategies. American Sociological Review 51: 273-286.

Warner, R. S. 1993. Work in progress toward a new paradigm for the sociological study of religion in the United States. American Journal of Sociology 98: 1044-1093.

Weber, M. 1978. Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Williams, R. H., and N. J. Demerath III. 1991. Religion and political process in an American city. American Sociological Review 56: 417-431.

COPYRIGHT 1996 Association for the Sociology of Religion
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group

Kaynak: 

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0SOR/is_n1_v57/ai_18262392/print